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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant refers the Court to the Statements
contained in his Brief and in the respondent's Brief.
Appellant acknowledges that the factual matters concerning
his divorce in the Navajo Tribal Court were not before
Judge Bunnell.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Xhe District Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction

over an action for child support between enrolled
members of the Navajo Tribe, one of whom is domiciled
on the Navajo Reservation, as a matter of Federal law.
2.

The District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over a
Navajo resident of the Navajo Reservation who has no
significant contacts with the State of Utah, as a
matter of Federal law.

ARGUMENT
1*

THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION FOR CHILD
SUPPORT BETWEEN ENROLLED MEMBERS OF THE
NAVAJO TRIBE OF WHOM ONE IS DOMICILED
ON THE NAVAJO RESERVATION.
Respondent's argument on the issue of subject

matter 1urisdiction can fairly be clarified and

summarized

and tribal sovereignty infringement, as developed in
Williams v. Lee (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.
2d 251.

As to the first method, the receipt of A.F.D.C.

benefits by the appellant's children upon the application
of their mother is, for some unexpounded

reason, substantial

and significant contact on the part of appellant with Utah.
As to the second method, because the New Mexico Supreme
Court long ago suggested

in Natewa v. Natewa

(1972), N.M.,

499 P.2d 691, and State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson (1973) ,^
N.M. 506 P.2d

786, that enforcement of a child support obli-

gation cannot infringe upon tribal sovereignty, respondent
believes the Utah Supreme Court is at liberty .to uncriticalj
follow the New Mexico court and, without further analysis,
find no infringement here.

Thus, according to respondent

the District Court's ruljlng may be upheld after either
analysis is performed.
Respondent's argument
numerous reasons.

|
is simplistic and untenable

First, respondent has failed to consider

the effect of preemption, as developed
Arizona State Tax Commissioner

in McClanahan v.

(1973), 411 U.S. 164, 93

S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129, on the District Court's jurisdlrMon.

Second, respondent dopR not consider that the

never analyzes nor states why the District Court's jurisdictional assertion creates no infringement upon tribal
sovereignty.

And infringement jtjs found h6re.

Fourth, re-

spondent does not understand that the significant

contacts

exception has never, by itself, been appropriate grounds for
jurisdiction where sovereignty infringement

is found.

Fifth,

respondent's assertion, that the receipt of benefits by
appellant's children is a substantial and significant

contact

by appellant with Utah,confuses the obligation of support
with the mere receipt of benefits, and such benefits do not,
in fact, create a significant contact between appellant and
Utah.

Each of these faults is considered

in turn.
l

a.

The State of Utah is preempted from
extending its civil authority over
the controversy at issue.

In State Securities Inc. V. Anderson
P.2d

(supra), 506

786, the New Mexico court rejected an argument that a

federal regulation,vesting original jurisdiction in tribal
courts over civil actions where the defendant is an Indian
and found within their territorial jurisdiction, and a provision of the New Mexico Constitution disclaiming any right
over Indian lands, acted to preempt New Mexico's jurisdiction

the federal regulations establishing
for such an extension
and 1326) .

the narrow procedures

(ie., 25 U.S.C. sections 1322, 1324, ]

Jji. , at p.793.

The dissenters were subsequently vindicated by thl
l

decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (197J
1

I

411 U.S. 164, when the United States Supreme Court said thai
f,

...the trend has been away from the idea of inherent India!

sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward re- 1
liance on federal preempt ion.,f, as is found by an examinatij
of

n

...the applicable treaties and statutes which define thl

limits of state power."

(411 U.S. at p.172.), and struck 1

down an extension of Arizona civil authority

(an income tan

on Navajos) not made in compliance with 25 U.S.C. sectional
1322, 1324 and 1326.
acknowledged

The New Mexico Supreme Court has sincl

this change, and significantly undermined t h e !

continuing viability of the State Securities decision, by lj
decision in Chino v. Chino

(1977), N.M., 561 P.2d 476.

J

In Chino, the New Mexico Court noted "...recent
cases shift the focus of analysis to the relevant

1

treatieaB

1
and statutes governing the tribes, and whether or not theym
would preempt state jur isdic t ion. "

I_d. at p.478.

The

3

1 i t r 1 <?H "f r 1 1 on

ov<*r*

1
n n a n -f mon q C r m r f

fhpn

conrludpd

thnt

Rtatp

law,

Jtd.. , at p.479.

This conclusion provided an indepen-

dent basis for upholding a lower court dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.
The purpose of this exposition is to show that
federal and state courts, including New Mexico, rely upon
preemption analysis as an initial step in examining cases
involving Indian controversies, and, where preemption is
found, it stands as an independent ground for barring the
asserted jurisdiction of a state court.
In his Brief, appellant established

that Utah

disclaimed jurisdiction over reservation lands within its
borders and has taken no legally sufficient

affirmative

steps to extend its civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations.

(Appellant's Brief, p.p. 17-19.)

Utah is therefore

preempted from any assertion of its civil authority over
persons or matters within these reservations.

Respondent

has not argued against this conclusion, and appellant
assumes that if this case is shown to involve an impermissible extension of Utah's civil authority, respondent would
concur that this case must be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on that basis alone.
Respondent has noted the paucity of factual

basis of preemption in this case.
The following facts are known: first, appellant
was a domiciliary of the Navajo Reservation and an enrolled
member of the Navajo Tribe at the time the A.F.D.C assistanc
was applied for and paid; second, the A.F.D.C. assistance wa
applied for by Helen Vijil for the support of appellant's
children, who are also enrolled members of the Navajo Trlbet
Respondent states that it cannot be determined

from the recO

whether the children and Helen Vijil were residents of the
Navajo Reservation or the State of Utah at the time the assistance was paid.

Additionally, it is known that under thtt

Utah Public Support of Children Act, Title 78, Chapter 45bfi
of the Utah Code, Utah's right to recover A.F.D.C. payments
is derivative of the recipients' right to recei\e child
support.

Finally, it is also known that the obligation

to support one's children does not arise under common law,
but rather under state statutes imposing a duty of support
Consequently, only four factual alternatives can
exist in this case.

First, the support obligation under

which Utah asserts its claim may have arisen under Navajo
///
in his Brief (p.16), appellant cited an unamended version of U.C.A.
78-45b-3(l)(a). The current version is reproduced in the Addendum*

tribal law, and both appellant and Helen VijiJ may have been
residents of the Navajo Reservation when the assistance was
paid.

Second, the support obligation may have arisen under

tribal law, but only the appellant may have been a resident
of the Reservation.

Third, the support obligation may have

arisen under authority of the state statute, with both
appellant and Helen Vijil being Reservation residents.
Fourth, the obligation may have arisen under the state
statute, but with only appellant being a Reservation resident
at the time the assistance was paid.
If the present action arises under either of the
first two factual alternatives, assertion of jurisdiction
under Title 78 Chapter 45b, of the Utah Code, requires the
extension of state civil authority, through application of
the procedures set out in the Code, to resolution of a dispute involving the Tribal-law support obligation of an
enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe, domiciled on the Navajo
Reservation.

If instead Utah's claim arises under the third

and fourth factual alternatives, then this action

implicates

the extension of the state's civil authority through application of the procedures of Title 78, Chapter 45b, and also
^n^nltrpp

in

r»v f- nn <z -{ n-n o f

r"f^^1

ntifbnrlfv

hv

-frnpnq'fnc*

Ufrih.'^

Therefore, no set of facts exists in this case
which does not involve an impermissible extension of Utah's
civil authority over the Navajo Reservation.

The only

factual alternatives upon which the claim could be based
require the extension of Utah's civil authority either by
imposing its support obligation statute on an enrolled
member of the Navajo Tribe domiciled on his Reservation, or
by imposing

its statutory support-arrearages

recovery

procedure on an enrolled member of the Tribe, domiciled on
the Reservation, where the support obligation arises under
Tribal law.

Any such extension of Utah's civil authority

is preempted under well-established

principles of federal

law*

b.

The State of Utah's assertion of
jurisdiction over the present action
infringes upon the sovereignty of
the Navajo Tribe.

As appellant stated in his Brief, a finding of
preemption closes out the necessity for further analysis,
and requires that ruling of the District Court be reversed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on this ground
alone.

The generalized considerations of sovereignty

Infringement

raised by the respondent, which in any event

illustrating

the rationale for finding an absence of subject

matter jurisdiction in the District Court over this action,
and respondents arguments in this regard will be answered.
Respondent contends that two New Mexico cases,
Natewa v. Natewa (supra), 499 P.2d 691 and State Securities,
Inc. v. Anderson

(supra), 506 P.2d

786, establish a principle

that only limited areas of subject matter are exclusively
within the jurisdiction of tribal courts, and an action to
collect child support arrearages is not one of these areas of
exclusive tribal jurisdiction.

Consequently, because there

are matters involving Indians where a state may exercise
jurisdiction without infringement upon tribal sovereignty,
the present action must be one of these.
In Natewa v. Natewa (1972), 499 P.2d 691, the New
Mexico Supreme Court was presented with a URESA action brought
by a spouse living in Wisconsin against an enrolled member of
the Zuni Tribe domiciled on his reservation, where the marriage had been contracted outside the Zuni Reservation.

The

defendant appeared twice in the New Mexico court before
moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court upheld the excercise of jurisdiction as not infringing upon tribal sovereignty, without explaining the

made a general appearance prior to making his motion to
dismiss*

Ibid .

It is also notable that the Court saw no

potential for infringement of tribal sovereignty pursuant
to its acknowledgement that the Tribal member's support
duty arose under the laws of New Mexico.
In State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson
N.M., 506 P.2d

(1973),

786, the New Mexico court examined a

suit

to recover overdue notes on an obligation incurred by
Indians outside their reservation,with

the action having

been initiated by service of process within the reservation
borders.

The Court noted the infringement analysis of

Williams v. Lee, but rejected a contention that service of
process caused such infringement.

According to the Court,

state court and tribal court jurisdiction are concurrent
unless the matter at issue involves a propriety interest in
reservation land, is a suit where one Indian sues another
Indian, or the transaction arises in Indian country.
at p.789.

Id.,

It appears that because service of process im-

plicates none of these restricted areas, and also because
the obligation was voluntarily

incurred off-reservation, tha

three-justice majority was unwilling to find infringement •
T11 <-,

^-tr^o^«-»fo-»-r-.

r t t m ^ f

•{ o f | p ^

f-V»n

T T I nr1r»m

n f

f- Vi -f c

y n n o o r» -f n rt

•"•iff*-

case which could be properly committed

to the tribal courts

under the jurisdictional powers granted to them*

jt_d • > at

pp.791-792.
The danger of reliance upon Natewa and State
Securities as the sole guides to infringement analysis is
that they have been superseded by decisions supporting the
dissent in State Securities.

In Fisher v. District Court

(suprgQ , 424 U.S. 382, the Supreme Court held that existence
of a tribal court able to resolve reservation-based

disputes

is an essential element of tribal sovereignty, and to permit
state courts to assert jurisdiction in a matter properly
committed
eignty.

to tribal courts would serve to weaken such soverSpecifically, the Court noted that allowing such a

jurisdictional

exercise

"...would subject a dispute arising on
the reservation among reservation Indians
to a forum other than the one they have
established for themselves..*[l]t would
create a substantial risk of conflicting
adjudications...and would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of
the Tribal Court."
(Emphasis supplied)
Id. , at pp.387-388.

Subsequently, in Santa Clara Pueblo v.

Martinez (1978), 436 U.S 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed. 106,
the Court suggested that providing either a state or federal

of R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority (1983,
9th Cir.), 719 F.2d 979, in which the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal declared
M

[a] tribe's interest in self-government
could be implicated in two ways. First,
if a state or federal court resolves a
dispute which was within the province
of the tribal courts. . . .that court would
impinge upon the tribe's right to adjudicate a controversy arising within it.11
Id. , at p. 983.
The more recent state court decisions have recognized this broad policy of preserving tribal sovereignty
by limiting the ability of state and federal courts to assume
jurisdiction over matters which may properly be resolved by
tribal courts.

These decisions have dropped the argument,

used in Natewa v. Natewa and State Securities Inc. v. Andersc
that tribal court jurisdiction is exclusive in only a narrow
range of subject areas.
In Chino v. Chino (supra) , 561 P.2d 476, the New
Mexico Supreme Court retreated from its view
"...that absolute jurisdiction is not
necessarily exclusive jurisdiction.
This rationale was relied upon by this
court in State Securities Inc. v.
Anderson, supra, to extend state jurisdiction, but recent decisions of the

matter consigned

to the tribal courts, noted a set of helpful

criteria to determine infringement.

Infringement was then

found to exist upon two bases: first, state adjudication of
an action concerning land within a reservation conflicts with
the tribe's exclusive civil jurisdiction over that land;
Second, and more

importantly,

[e]ven though the Mescalero tribal law
makes no provision for a wrongful entry
and detainer action, the state may not
assume jurisdiction without congressional
or tribal authorization.
Indian customs
and traditions may dictate different
approaches that that which the state may
use. For a state to move into areas where
Indian law and procedure have not achieved
the degree of certainty of state law and
procedure would deny Indians the opportunity of developing their own system. (Emphasis
supplied).
Id. , at p.479
Consequently, sovereignty

infringement

analysis

cannot be limited to making an inventory of the narrow range
of subject areas believed to have been the exclusive province
of tribal courts in 1973.

Since that time the issue has been

transformed, and the proper initial inquiry is whether the
matter is one over which the tribal courts can properly
exercise jurisdiction.

If an affirmative answer is made,

then state court lurisdiction is barred.

Other considerations

disregard of its judgment.

And, in a related question, an

examination must be made of whether this potential for conflict may stifle the use of custom law in the development oi
the tribal court system.
Through these recent developments, the majority
opinion in State Securities Inc. v. Anderson is eviscerated
and the dissent is vindicated.

The sharp curtailment of

state law incursions also brings the decision of Natewa v.
Natewa into doubt.

It is unlikely that the New Mexico

courts would now be so carefree in asserting that "...no
citation is needed to support the moral and social obligation
of a parent to support his children.1'

(499 P.2d at p.693),

or that all a state court needs to obtain jurisdiction in
a URESA action is

f,

...the existence of a duty of support.••

under the laws of the responding state."

(Ibid»)

Both

statements demonstrate an utter lack of regard for the righl
of tribal authorities to apply their own support obligation
laws to tribal members, to determine the measure of a suppoi
obligation for resident tribal members, and to have the
tribal judicial system adjudicate disputes concerning that
obligation free of conflict with the state courts.

Natewa

should probably be limited to its facts, with an emphasis

are some areas where state jurisdiction is allowed, and
that this case represents one of those areas.

Instead, this

Court must squarely face the issues presented by recent
decisions dealing with sovereignty

infringement.

In general, as was seen in Section la, this action
could have arisen under only four alternative factual settings.
The resolution of this action under those settings requires
either that a tribal support obligation be resolved under
Utah procedural law, or that an enrolled resident member of
the Navajo Tribe will have imposed upon him a support obligation derived from Utah statutory authority.

Both of these

alternatives infringe upon the right of Navajos to make their
own laws and be ruled by them, either by making resolution of
a Tribal support obligation subject to potentially
foreign procedural rules, or by undermining

conflicting,

the authority of

the Tribe to determine the parameters of child support obligations generally applicable to its resident members.
More specifically, the Court must consider that
the Navajo Tribe has created a court system which has jurisdiction over the present action to collect child

support

arrearages, and has further established procedures for enforr^ncr qurli Hp11nnupnt obligation6*.

(See. Appellant'^ Brief,

Court undermines the authority of the Navajo Tribal courts
and infringes upon Navajo

sovereignty.

This court must also consider that, as an enrolled
resident member of the Navajo Tribe, appellant could apply
to the Navajo Courts for a modification of his support
obligation.

The potential for such action raises the

spectre of conflicting adjudications between the Utah courts
and the Navajo courts over the nature and amount of appellant
support obligation, with the probable consequence that the
Navajo Court judgment will be disregarded
Title 78, Chapter 45b of the Utah Code.

in an action under
For this reason,

once appropriate jurisdiction is found in the Navajo Court,
this fact must exclude the Utah courts from acquiring conflicting

jurisdiction.
And equally important

is the effect that such

conflict may have on the development of tribal law.
In a recent decision of the Navajo Courts, the effect of
traditional law on issues surrounding dissolution of
marriage was examined.
"By Navajo tradition, at the time of
marriage the husband will normally move
in with the wife's clan.
Traditionally
the father and the children live with
the mother's family, and children are said

the wife and children go to her mother's
unit and the husband remains. I^ci. at 76.
As to dividing property, the couple keep
what was theirs before marriage and the
wife keeps the remainder. One researcher
summed up the procedure this way:
M

Among the people who follow the
old laws, the divorce procedure is
very simple; the man merely states
as he walks out of the hogan: "Tsehah-maz (Stone Rolls Out.") He takes
with him all the goods that were his
before marriage. Any property accumulated during the union remains with
his wife." Van Valkenburgh, "Navajo
Common Law 1," 9 Museum Notes 17, 22
(1936).
[ ][Par.] There was a principle in finality
in Navajo customary divorce, and the principle of restoring harmony in the community by
quickly and finally breaking ties so the community can soon return to normal is one which
is common-sense. To permit a former spouse
to keep such ties that she or he may be siad
[sic] to be lurking behind the hogan waiting
to take a portion of the corn harvest is
unthinkable, since each spouse returns to his
or her own family after the divorce. Each
former spouse should return home after making
the break and disturb and [sic] other no more.
Apache v. Republic National Life Insurance Company
3 Navajo Reporter 250, 252-254.
Navajo, Mankind Publishing

(1982),

See, Locke, Book of the

(1979), p.17 ["A

woman...owns

the children, which belong to her clan...."].
Under traditional law the wife's ownership of the

Tom Tso, has stated that he would give favorable consideration to arguments made under this traditional rule

to with-

draw a child support obligation altogether under appropriate
circumstances.
Consequently, if this action were brought in tribal,
court, Appellant might be able to raise defenses under Navajoj
customary law unavailable in the state forum.

And because an,

enrolled resident member of the Navajo Tribe cannot raise
these defenses as a result of the imposition of state court
jurisdiction, as noted in Chino v. Chino, the Navajo tribe
is denied the right to develop its own judicial system cover-!
ing the actions of its resident members according to the
different approaches which Navajo customs and traditions
may dictate.

Thus, the District Court's assertion of juris-

diction undermines the authority of the Navajo judiciary
and infringes upon the right of the Navajo to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.
In summary, respondent's argument concerning a
lack of sovereignty infringement in this case do not squarely meet the issues raised by recent decisions on this subject
Infringement exists in this case on any of three grounds.
First, under the general

rule, once jurisdiction over nn

may exercise jurisdiction and produce a judgment

in conflict

with that of the District Court, Tribal court authority is
undermined, and Navajo sovereignty is diminished.

Third,

such conflict impedes the ability of the Navajo tribal courts
to develop their own law on the subject of child support, based
on custom or tribal common law, by imposing foreign child support law and procedures on a resident, enrolled member of the
Tribe*

The cumulative effect is to diminish the importance

of tribal courts in resolving tribal matter^, thereby al86
diminishing tribal
c.

sovereignty.

The "substantial contacts1' exception
to the preemption of state civil authority
is not properly applied to this action.

As was noted in the Appellant's Brief

(pp.24-25),

some state courts have developed an exception to the preemption rule of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission
(supra), 411 U.S. 164.

Based on an analysis of the Montana

cases which are the chief source of the exception, it appears
to have three distinct steps.
rule, a state is preempted

First, under the McClanahan

from extending its civil authority

over reservation affairs by an assertion of jurisdiction in
the case at hand.
f-o

nc?qprf-

Second, if the state is eventually allowed

1 ii r-f qd-f r f-f r»r» u n d n r

f-TiP p ^ r p p t-f o n , th-fq

art" mtiqf

contacts standards which due process requires.
Respondent has not grasped this sequence, as
respondent's brief seems to assert that so long as substantial contact is found within Utah, the requirements of this
exception are met.

Respondent also claims, without analysis,

that the fact of appellant's children receiving A.F.D.C
payments in Utah is a substantial contact between appellant
and Utah sufficient to meet the due process standard which
the exception requires.
In applying the exception to this case, the preemption of Utah from asserting subject matter
in this action has been amply developed
this Reply.

jurisdiction

in Section la of

The first step of the exception is met.

But

it has also been explained that assertion of jurisdiction
in this case infringes upon the sovereignty of the Navajo
Tribe.

Therefore, the exception fails on its second require-

ment and cannot be used to grant jurisdiction to the District
Court in this case.

Respondent has apparently missed this

point, as it confines its discussion to the existence of
substantial contacts.
To answer respondent on the point of substantial
rnnf^rfq.

nnnpl1nnf

nnfpq

th n t

fbpre are

nonp h P r P .

Follow-

But this statement does not answer whether there is any
contact between appellant and Utah, or whether it is significant and substantial.
The known facts giving rise to the claim can be
divided into three parts: first, the act on non-support by
appellant while a domiciliary of the Navajo Reservation;
second, the application of Helen Vijil to the state of Utah
for payment of A.F.D.C. benefits; third, payment of benefits
to Helen Vijil for appellant's children.
The standards for weighing minimum contacts were
fully developed

in Appellant's Brief

(pp.27-29), and may

fairly be summarized as requiring a voluntary act on the par
of the non-resident defendant by which he purpose-fully
himself of conducting activities in the forum state.

aval

The

unilateral activity of one claiming a relationship with the
non-resident cannot satisfy this standard.
Here, the sole activity of appellant is his nonpayment of support while a resident of the Navajo Reservatio
This act (or non-act) did not occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of the State of Utah.

It is an outgrowth of

domestic relations or domestic activities which appellant
has always maintained within the Navaio Reservation.

Ap-

said to represent a voluntary activity on the part of the
appellant in Utah.

Therefore, appellant has no significant

contacts with Utah sufficient to satisfy the interests of
fair play and substantial justice.
Nor would appellant have sufficient contact with
Utah under Utah's own long-arm statute (U.C.A. section 7827-24).

Reference to the long-arm statute has a practical

purpose in determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving Indian controversies.
"The best solution in these c ircumst ances
is for sta te court s to rely on state longarm statut es to ob tain limite d juris diction
over the r eservati on Indian, Such 1 imited
state cour t jurisd iction woul d have two
advantages
First , long-arm jurisdi ction
is depende nt upon the subject matter of the
suit and i ts appro priateness for lit igation
in the sta te forum
Conseque ntly, 1 ongarm statut es would not confer state court
jurisdicti on over controversi es that are
essentiall y reserv ation-based . Although
state cour ts might occasional ly obta in
jurisdicti on over actions in which t ribal
courts wou Id concu rrently be entitle d to
jurisdicti on, such limited co ncurren t
jurisdicti on would constitute minima 1 intrusion in to triba 1 affairs, particu larly
since juri sdic tion would depe nd upon a
substantia 1 relation between the for urn and
the matter at suit
Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973
Utah T, . 13 P V . ?06

??f».

Aq nnfnH in Appellor, t-1- p ,~-f 0 f
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Such a conclusion is consistent with the general minimum
contacts analysis showing that the appellant's activities
are insufficient to establish substantial contacts with Utah.
The

ff

significant contacts" exception

fails on two grounds.

therefore

First, assertion of jurisdiction by

the District Court does infringe upon Navajo sovereignty.
Second, appellant's activities are insufficient to establish
minimum contacts with Utah either under general principles
or by reference to the Utah long-arm statute.

Jurisdiction

of the District Court is preempted and the significant
contacts exception cannot be used to justify an assertion
of jurisdiction in the face of such preemption.

II.

THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER A NAVAJO RESIDENT
OF THE NAVAJO RESERVATION WHO HAS
NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH UTAH.

Appellant fully agrees with the respondent's
assertion that the same factors which grant or deny subject
matter jurisdiction to a state court also determine whether
personal jurisdiction exists.

However, an examination of

the law and facts of this case show that Utah is preempted
from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over this action,
///

would infringe upon the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation if
it did assert subject matter jurisdiction, and that the
appellant has not had sufficient significant contact with
Utah to establish either subject matter or personal jurisdiction in the District Court.

Therefore, as Utah is pre-

cluded from asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this action, it is also precluded from asserting jurisdiction over the person of appellant.

CONCLUSION
As observed in the opening section of this Reply,
respondent's argument in support of the District Court's
exercise of subject matter and personal jurisdiction in
this action fails on five independent grounds.

First, ever

set of facts under which this action could have arisen
requires the extension of state civil authority by imposing
Utah's statutory support obligation on a reservation domici
Navajo, or by subjecting a reservation-based

support obli-

gation to the statutory resolution procedures of U.C.A.
78-45b, or by both.

Utah is preempted from extending its

civil authority over the Navajo Reservation in these ways.
Second, sovereignty infringement analysis has
been transformed since the days when a state court could
list a narrow range of subject areas consigned to the
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribal court and claim concurrent jurisdiction
///

(and absence of infringement).
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Recent

cases propose that when a tribal court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over a matter, that jurisdiction is exclusive,
and any attempted concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the
state court is barred.

This policy seeks to avoid diminish-

ing the authority of the tribal court by subjecting

disputes

to conflicting adjudications, or by inhibiting the tribal
court from developing its own system for dealing with disputes
based upon the unique features of its customs or common law.
Third, in the present case the Navajo Tribal
courts could appropriately exercise jurisdiction over this
action.

Appellant could also seek a modification of his sup-

port duty in the Tribal Court which would be in conflict with
the obligation imposed on him by Utah law under 78-45b.

The

nature of this modification could even lead to the total
dissolution of his support obligation under Navajo custom
law.

But this defense, and its development, is stifled by

Utah's assertion of jurisdiction over this matter.

In

general, the present action infringes upon Navajo Tribal
sovereignty either by imposing Utah's statutory

support

obligation upon a resident member of the Tribe, or by
requiring resolution of a Tribal support obligation
Utah's statutory

procedural system.

through

Either circumstance

intrudes upon the Tribe's right to make their own rules
in these areas.

For each of these reasons, the District

Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this action infringes
upon Tribal sovereignty.
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Fourth, the "substantial contacts" exception to
state preemption of civil authority in Indian controversies
is based upon a tripartite test, having as its parts: preemption; lack of infringement; substantial contacts.
emption is found here.

Pre-

However, the District Court's

jurisdictional assertion infringes on Navajo sovereignty.
Therefore, the test is inapplicable to the present case on
this basis alone*
Fifth, appellant has no significant

contacts

with Utah sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of
due process.

Mere physical presence is not a sufficient

in-state contact for an Indian domiciled upon his reservatlo
in the state.

Appellant's sole act in this matter was the

ion-payment of support while a domiciliary of the Navajo
Reservation.

Application for, and receipt of, AFDC benefits

tfere merely the unilateral acts of one claiming a relationship to appellant, and represent no voluntary act on the par
of appellant.

Additionally, under Utah's long-arm statute,

appellant has done no act sufficient to place him within
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts.
Finally, appellant notes his agreement with
respondent over respondent's statement that personal jurisdiction lives or dies upon the same factors as subject
matter jurisdiction.

Therefore, because the District Court

could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this
action, neither did it have jurisdiction over the person
///
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appellant•
It therefore follows from the foregoing that the
judgment in this action must be vacated, and the writ of
garnishment it supports must be quashed.

Date : t^S^VUj^uy

('r'i*^

Attorney for Appellant
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78-45b-3. Applicant's right to support from other party assigned to departnent — Enforcement (1) [a] As a condition of eligibility for assistance, an applit
ant for or recipient of assistance is considered to have assigned to the state all
ights to support from any other person which have accrued at the time the assignnent is executed or (if none is executed) at the time of application for assistance,
md which the applicant or recipient may have in his or her own behalf or in behalf
f anjr other family member for whom the applicant or recipient ]s applying for
r receiving assistance. Any right to support which an applicant or recipient of
ublic assistance has or claims, passes to the state under the assignment, jy* Jy
peration of law upon receipt of assistance by the recipient even if the recipient
oes not execute an assignment, tn the event that If assistance is furnished by
tie department orTn instances where if the department has contracted to collect
upport, the department shall become trustee of any cause of action or claims of
le obligee or any minor child in that obligee's custody, to recover support due
that obligee from any person and may bring and maintain the action either in
j own name or in the name of the obligee.
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No. A-CV-02-80
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION
June 11. 1982
Paulette ARVISO, Appellant,
vs.
Rodger DAHOZY, Appellee,
OPINION AND ORDER
Appeal heard June 11. 1982 before Acting Chief Justice Marie F. Neswood
and Associate Justices Robert Walters and Homer Bluehouse.
Appeal from Window Rock District Court, Hon. Harry Brown presiding.
Leonard Watchman, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for
appellant and William P. Battles, Esq., Battles & Associates, Fort Defiance,
Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellee.
Remanded.
This is an appeal by means of a trial de novo from an order
entered in the District Court at Window Rock on January 3, 1980.
This court has jurisdiction over the parties because they are
enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe and they reside within the exterior
boundaries of the Navajo Nation. The court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case - the marriage, children and property of the
marriage - because the action for divorce arose within the territorial
jurisdiction under the laws of the Navajo Nation (Tit. 9, Ch. 5, Navajo
Tribal Code).
Therefore this court has sole jurisdiction over the
matter. See Mangold, "Powers of Indian Tribes," 55 Interior Decisions
14, 40-41(1934) (Interior Dept. Solicitor Opinion).
The issues in dispute here are ones of fact and not law, to be
resolved by the new trial held before the Court of Appeals. The
question presented is this: On September 2, 1977 the trial court
entered a default judgment providing for child support of $200 per
month for a minor child. Custody of the child was given to the plaintiff
mother, Paulette Dahozy. The child support matter came back to court
because of a complaint Mr. Dahozy had not made the ordered child
support payments, and on October 5, 1978 the court entered an order
approving a stipulation of the parties. This court finds the stipulation
was that Mr. Dahozy would pay the sum of $125 per month on the
arrearage and for child support until June of 1987, when the $200 per
month payment would resume. Further problems with nonpayment lead
to a judgment and order dated July 19, 1979 in which the court did not
fix an arrearage but ordered the defendant to pay $1,550 in past child
support with H to be paid within 30 days and the other h to be paid
within 60 days. Provision was made for a five-day grace period and
late charges of $2 per day. The child support went back to $200 per
month, and the defendant was ordered to arrange for a payroll
deduction to guarantee the payments.
-84-
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The problem presented to this court comes from an interpretation
of the stipulation made in October of 1978 and the judgment enteied in
July of 1979. Very simply put, Mr. Dahozy came before the court on
December 5, 1979 and said he did not owe any back child support and
he had complied with the July judgment by giving Mrs. Dahozy a check
for $1,550. He produced the check in evidence over Mrs. Dahozy's
objections. Mrs. Dahozy argues that the $1,550 check was not made to
comply with the court's older but it was one-half of a stipulated
arrearage of $3,100.
The intention of the patties as to their stipulation was not
clearly set forth in documents submitted to the court, as it should have
been, and the resolution of this case is based upon another party to
the stipulation negotiations, the Honorable Nelson J. McCabe, the trial
judge sitting on July 18, 1979.
Judge McCabe was called before the Court of Appeals by subpoena, and he testified Mrs. Dahozy's position and recollection are
correct.
Therefore it is the unanimous finding of the Court of Appeals
that the $1,550 paid represents one-half of a prior arrearage of $3,100
and the other $1,550 is due and owing.
The question now is what a proper order of the Court of Appeals
would be. This court declines to sit as a three-judge divorce court.
The proper role of a court of appeals is to coriect manifest errors in the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of a trial court. Our jurisdiction is generally confined to appeals, remedying acts of a ttial court
beyond its jurisdiction and requiring trial court action whete it
unlawfully fails or refuses to act within its jurisdiction. 7 NTC Sees.
302, 303. Therefore we will not resolve the factual questions of other
child support arrearages due, late charges due or other matters.
As to the question of late charges, this court notes a great deal
of time has passed since October of 1978 and it observes the fact the
amount of late charges could amount to a rather Jarge sum. The
primary party to be considered in this case is the child, and ptoviding
for her support is the goal. The focus should be on the interests of
the child and not upon penalizing the defendant for his failuie to
support his own child.
While nonsupporting parents should be
penalized and punished for the failute to live up to their moral and
legal duties, such penalties and punishments should not further hamper
doing what must be done - supporting the child. Therefore the trial
court should consider the matter of the late charges using its equity
powers of fairness and seeing the object of the case is served. The
trial court should consider the income, property and other resources of
the defendant in assessing late charges. The primary goal of the court
should be to see that child support arrearages aie eliminated as quickly
as possible.
With regard to the method of taking care of the
arrearage, the trial court order that the defendant make arrangements
for payroll deductions was wise and fair. Therefore the trial court
should make arrangements in any final order for such deductions
directly.
There is one final point to be made about this appeal. The
problem which caused this case came from imprecision in drafting
documents submitted to the court.
While the October, 1978 order
clearly sets forth an arrearage, there is confusion in how much was to
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go to the arrearage and how much was to be applied to current child
support. The July 19, 1979 otder does not set foith the arrearage. All
orders such as those should state:
1.
The amount of total arrearage;
2.
The period of the arrearage (I.e. what months were not
paid);
3.
The amount to be paid in Installments on the arrearage (if
that method applies);
4.
The amount of continuing monthly child suppoit;
5.
The method of payment on arrearage;
6.
The date any payments are to commence; and
7.
Other pertinent orders, making certain all the agreements
of the parties are in writing.
Otherwise a party should not be permitted to attack matters left
out of a stipulation or order, except In cases of fraud, misrepresentation
or like matters of equity.
Theiefore it is heieby
ORDERS that this matter is remanded to the Disttict Coutt of
the Navajo Nation at Window Rock for fuither ptoceedings in accoi dance
with this opinion. The plaintiff shall be granted her costs on appeal.
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No.

A-CV-29-81

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION
September 16, 1982
Benjamin LEE, Appellant.
vs.
Mary Lynn FOSTER, Appellee.
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Review of appeal by Chief Justice Nelson J. McCabe.
Appeal from Window Rock District Court, the Honorable Tom Tso presiding.
William P. Battles, Esq., Battles ft Associates, Fort Defiance, Navajo
Nation (Arizona) for Appellant and William Shepherd, Esq., DNA,
Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellee.
Appeal dismissed.
This is an appeal from an order of the Window Rock Dlstiict
Court which fixed an arrearage figure for child support which was
found to be due and owing, and confirmed a prior child support monthly
payment order.
The reasons for appeal assigned in a brief before the coutt
complain: 1. There was an oral continuance granted by a judge other
than the regular judge for the judicial district, but the regular judge
for the district proceeded with a hearing; 2. The court did not have
sufficient testimony upon which to base its order; 3. Theie was no
accounting to the court regarding the condition and well being of the
minor child; and 4. The court ignored blood grouping motions.
The question to be decided here is whether the reasons shown
for the appeal are enough to show "good cause" for the purpose of the
statute allowing appeals for good cause.
*•
The continuance: Judge Brown apparently granted an oral
continuance and Judge Tso, the regular district judge, found Judge
Brown had no jurisdiction to grant a continuance. Further, the appellant was present at the arrearage hearing and refused to provide information to the court when asked to speak.
This ground is not enough to show "good cause" because this
court takes judicial notice that Judge Tso is the regular sitting judge in
the Window Rock District. There are no affidavits or other matters in
the record to overcome the presumption that only Judge Tso was
authorized to grant a continuance. Further, the appellant was present
at the hearing and had the opportunity to bring up continuance, but
apparently did not do so. He also had the opportunity to answer very
simple fact question, "Sir, did you pay the monthly child support which
this court ordered or did you not?" The appellant was not prejudiced
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by the action of the curt, and any error arising out of the continuance
matter was quite apparently hatmless.
2.
Testimony to support the order: The proceeding before the
District Court was simple. On December 3, 1979 the appellant was
found to be the father of a child, and the court ordered that the
appellant pay $150 per month for the support of the child. The mother
of the child later came before the court by means of a petition for an
order to show cause to compel the appellant to pay accrued child support
The only questions the court had to decide were whether the appellant
had obeyed the prior order, and, if money was owing, how much. The
court's findings clearly show an arrearage for the period between the
judgment and April of 1981, and that $2,500 was due and owing. The
testimony of the mother would sound something like this: "Since the
court ordered Mr. Lee to pay $150 per month for the support of his
child in December of 1979, he has paid me nothing."
The trial court's findings are clearly based upon sufficient
testimony.
3'
Accounting for the condition and well being of the child:
This is about as frivolous an argument as has ever been presented to
this court. The legal issue raised by the pleadings before the court
was whether or not the appellant had obeyed the court by paying child
support. The appellant cites utterly no authority for the proposition
that any court has any obligation to make an inquiry about the child in
a proceeding such as this. Of course he would be unable to find any.
Fathers who owe child support often attempt to raise smokescreens by
way of hypocritical concern for the child or a false demand for child
custody, and the Courts of the Navajo Nation should never tolerate
such conduct.
4*
The blood grouping motions: This is another smokescreen
raised by the appellant. The issue before the court was not paternity.
That issue was decided in December of 1979. The appellant's brief goes
on at length about the concept of res adjudicata, and certainly that
idea is applicable to this case. Res adjudicata forecloses any question
of blood grouping tests with respect to the environment of an ajudicated
and binding paternity judgment.
This review of the appeal before the court shows that the appellant has raised no matters of record which support his contentions
regarding the continuance and certainly nothing has been shown which
overcomes the presumption that Judge Brown had no authority to act.
The remaining arguments which were generally raised but not supported,
are frivolous and an affront to this court.
Therefore this appeal is DISMISSED.
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WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT
September 16, 1982
No.

WR-CV-197-82

OPINION AND ORDER
FAYE APACHE, and JUDY GLANZER,
Administratrix for the
ESTATE OF BOYD APACHE, Plaintiffs, v.
REPUBLIC NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
and REBECCA JANE APACHE, Defendants.
Honorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.
It often happesn that cases which pose a simple legal question to
be answered by the court are not as simple as they seem. This Is one
of those cases.
The situation itself is rather simple. Boyd Apache and Rebecca
Jane Jim were married on July 2, 1977 in Phoenix, Arizona, and at one
point Mr. Apache named his wife as the beneficiary to his group life
insurance policy with the Republic National Life Insurance Company.
The policy is one which the employees of the Navajo Nation have as a
part of their employment, and as it was with most tribal employees, Mr.
Apache designated his wife as the beneficiary of the policy.
The couple separated, and in October of 1981 the wife obtaind a
default divorce. One probem with default divorces is that spouses who
are anxious to sever their ties with each other are often negligent
about making arrangements for all their property interests in a divorce
decree. That was the situation here, and neither Mr. or Mrs. Apache
thought to settle who the beneficiary to the insurance policy would be.
Mr. Apache did not think of changing the beneficiary to his group life
policy, and he died in an auto crash about a month after the divorce
without doing so.
The dispute here is between the former spouse, who is named as
the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds, and the mother and sister of
the decedent. This court has already ruled that the former wife lost
any interest in the insurance proceeds because of the divorce, and she
now asks the court to reconsider that ruling.
All the parties ask the simple legal question: "Does a spouse
named as an insurance beneficiary lose the right to insurance due to a
divorce?"
The former wife urges the court to say "no," relying upon
Arizona law and the principle that insurance policies are contract matters
in which the terms of the contract must be enforced.
The mother and sister-administratrix say "yes," urging the court
to find an insurable interest had been terminated and to find that
under Navajo customary law a divorce severs all rights of the former
spouse.
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The parties have presented several legal issues in their briefs
(and very well), and the court finds a procedural barrier it must pass
over before reaching the reasoning required to answer the question
posed. The legal battier is that of whether or not the court is required to apply apparently dispositive Arizona state law. Then the
legal alternatives which appear to be available are:
1. Applying the flat rule of Arizona that the policy designation
is valid;
2. Finding there is no insurable interest such as to make the
beneficiary designation valid;
3. Finding a termination of the interest of the former wife in
the policy; or
4. Declaring a Navajo customary law which terminates a former
spouse's interest;.
THE CHOICE OF LAW IN THIS CASE
The decendent was a resident of the Arizona portion of the
Navajo Nation, and the former spouse says that the court is required to
apply Arizona law which is favorable to the position she takes. This
court is required to apply any federal law or Navajo laws or customs of
the Navajo Nation which may be applicable to a particular civil action.
7 NTC Sec. 204(a). If the court finds there are no applicable Navajo
statutory or customary laws or if it finds there is no applicable federal
law, then it must apply the law of the state where the dispute arises. 7
NTC Sec. 204(c). Therefore the choice of law question is resolved if
there is an£ applicable Navajo or federal law. The court finds that
there is no applicable federal law or Navajo statutory law with regard to
the legal question here, but that there is Navajo customary law which
may be applied.
NAVAJO CUSTOMARY LAW
Paragraph IV of the mother and sister's petition for an injunction raises the legal question of custom in this way:
"That by Navajo tradition, Rebecca Apache upon
divorce to Boyd Apache relinquished all rights and
title to his property, and upon the final decree of
divorce as a single unmarried person having no claim
or right to the estate or insurance of Boyd Apache."
This allegation adequately and properly put the opposing parties on
notice that Navajo custom would be relied upon as applicable law. The
former spouse complains that at the time of the final hearing in this
case there was no evidence on what the custom is, although theie was
argument about it. She also says that there was no advice by "counsellors familiar with . . . customs and usages," as provided for by 7
NTC Sec. 204(b).
It is only where there is a doubt regarding the custom or
usuage that the court need avail itself of experts in Navajo culture,
and the statute permits the court to take judicial notice of Navajo
traditional law. It is clear that a judge not only may, but must take
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judicial notice of local law. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Sec. 335 (2nd. Ed. 1972J. If one argues Ifiat custom ancf
tradition are matters of factual evidence and not reading the law as it
is printed, it is clear that this court can take judicial notice of customs
as adjudicative facts. R. 5, Rules of Evidence. Thus, if the custom is
generally known within the community, or it can be found by resort to
accurate sources, it is proven. In the Navajo context, the comment by
a dean of one law shcool that "Judicial notice may only be taken of
those facts every damn fool knows" is appropriate. McCormick, supra,
p. 761, f.25.
Whether or not Navajo custom will decide this case depends upon
whether the court can take judicial notice of Navajo marriage and divorce
customs "every damn fool knows."
By Navajo tradition, at the time of marriage the husband will
normally move in with the wife's clan. Traditionally the father and any
children live with the mother's family, and children are said to "belong"
to the mother's clan. Kluckhon and Leighton, The Navaho, 100 (Rev.
Ed. 1974). When there is a divorce and the coup!e~is living with the
wife's family, the husband simply returns to his own mother's unit.
Witherspoon, Navaho Kinship and Marriage, 75 (1975). If the divorce
takes place at the residence area of the husband, then the wife and
children go to her mother's unit and the husband remains. Id. at 76.
As to dividing property, the couple keep what was theirs before marriage and the wife keeps the remainder. One researcher summed up the
procedure this way:
"Among the people who follow the old laws, the
divorce procedure is very simple; the man merely
states as he walks out of the hogan: "Tse-hah-maz
(Stone Rolls Out.") He takes with him all the goods
that were his before marriage. Any property accumulated during the union remains with his wife." Van
Valkenburgh, "Navajo Common Law 1," 9 Museum Notes
17, 22 (1936).
Another method of divorce was counselling by the wife's father and,
when it appeared there could be no reconciliation, the couple would
"split the blanket," dividing equally the goods they acquired during the
marriage. Therefore it would appear that in the absence of an agreement, the wife would take all.
Navajo customs cannot be applied in a vacuum, and they must be
applied with logic in accordance with present circumstances. It is not
correct to say that Navajo custom cannot be applied to situations such
as this, where there are contracts binding commercial entities from the
outside that don't understand local situations.
That is nonsense,
because Navajo custom and tradition i as much the law of the Navajo
Nation as a tribal council resolution or a statute in the Nava(o^ Tribal
Code. Contracts of insurance are made subject to the" local law of
contract or insurance, and that local law determines the validity and
construction of the contract. 43 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance Sec. 29.
Applying these principles of Navajo custom, we can find that
there is a custom of finally terminating a marriage by someone moving,
the woman keeping the property when the move is made or the couple
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making an equal division of marital property before going their own
ways. The principle of finality requires that the court say there is an
event which cuts the tics of the parties, and the event here is the
divorce.
Under Navajo custom the woman can simply keep the property of
the marriage and send the man to his own family, taking only his own
property acquired before the marriage.
She also has the option of
working out an arrangement with the man. In modern times, the, woman
has the further choice of coming into a court using Anglo-European
ways, and that is what happened here. The woman left the man and fileo*.
a divorce acting against him. Importantly, she had the option of demanding a property settlement but the decree only provides for child support.
She therefore left the decedent with his remaining property.
The life insurance policy Navajo tribal employees have is not
whole life insurance in which a cash value builds - it is an ordinary life
policy which provides coverage only so long as the premiums are paid.
Ownership rights to the proceeds of the policy are not absolute and can
change at the will of the policyholder. See Harris v. Harris, 493 P.2d
407, 408 (N.M. 1972). Therefore the former wIfe~Kas no right to the
policy proceeds as such. Because Navajo customs show us that there
was finality to custom divorces (forbidden here since 1940; 9 NTC Sec.
407) and since the former wife left the husband, leaving property
behind her, this court must hold that as a matter of Navajo customary
law she surrendered any further right in the policy.
It has been said that in additon to the fact of divorce a former
wife may lose her interest as a beneficiary under an insurance policy
by an agreement of the parties which can be construed as a relinquishment of the spouse's rights to the insurance. 44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance
Sec. 1740. For the purpose of Navajo customary law this court must
hold that leaving a spouse is just such a relinquishment of rights. If
the woman has no further interest in the man, then she should have no
interest in his life. "(T)he belief that the beneificary of life insurance
should have an interest in the insured's continued life, is very ancient
and still persists."
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104
F.2d 665, 667 (2nd Cir. 1939). It Is common "principle of"law that the
agreement of the parties can be construed by their actions. Here there
was a desertion and a divorce in which no property was claimed,
leaving the clear inference the former wife was satisfied with the property division. This conduct is, of itself, sufficient to show her agreement that she would give up any future rights to the former husband's
property.
CONCLUSION
The general American legal principle appears to be that a former
wife named as a beneficiary in an Insurance policy is entitled to its
proceeds. There was formerly a Texas rule that the woman lost an
insurable interest in the man's life ( i . e . a valid interest in there being
insurance on him to which she is the beneficiary) upon divorce. This
court of course does not rely upon insurance law but upon the clear
effect of divorce by Navajo custom in holding contrary to the general
American rule. This is perfectly proper and not offensive to any sense
of Anglo-European justice. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., above, p.
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667. There was a principle of finatlty in Navajo customary divorce, and
the principle of restoring hatmony in the community by quickly and
finally breaking ties so the community can soon return to normal is one
which is common-sense. To permit a former spouse to keep such ties
that she or he may be siad to be lurking behind the hogan waiting to
take a portion of the corn harvest is unthinkable, since each spouse
returns to his or her own family after the divorce. Each fotmer spouse
should return home after making the break and disturb and other no
more.
Therefore the motion to reconsider the judgment of July 13, 1982
is hereby DENIED.
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